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Three separate studies established the psychometric properties of the Scrambled 
Sentences Test for Big Picture Appraisal (SST-BPA), a performance measure which 
entails viewing difficult situations and one’s&reactions to them in terms of a larger context 
that includes perspectives such as extended time, one’s&broader life, and common human 
struggles. Study 1 established the content validity of the SST-BPA by showing that 
judges rated SST-BPA items as consistent with a description of the construct. In Studies 
2 and 3, participants completed paper- and computer-administered versions (respectively) 
of the SST-BPA along with self-report measures of similar and dissimilar constructs. 
Item-total correlations supported internal consistency and correlations with other 
measures supported convergent and discriminant validity of the SST-BPA. 
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Chapter 1: Literature Review  
 
Emotions arise in reaction to internal or external stimuli and can be positive or 
negative. While emotions play an important role in influencing behavioral responses, 
decision-making, and memory, they are not always helpful. For example, emotions can 
occur at the wrong time or at the wrong intensity level (Gross & Thompson, 2007). In 
response to this, individuals have developed a natural tendency to regulate their emotions, 
or attempt to influence the experience and expression of their emotions (Gross, 1998; 
2007). Importantly, emotion regulation can be done consciously or unconsciously and 
regulatory strategies may be automatic or controlled. Emotion regulation becomes 
clinically relevant upon examining its correlation with mental health: Emotion 
dysregulation is involved in over half of the DSM-IV Axis I disorders and in all of the 
Axis II disorders (Gross & Levenson, 1997). This evidence suggests that emotion 
regulation plays a central role in the development and maintenance of psychopathology, 
making it of particular importance for empirical study.  
 
UNDERSTANDING EMOTION: THE MODAL MODEL OF EMOTION 
 
 According to Gross & Thompson (2007), three core features of emotion make up 
the modal model of emotion: “a person-situation transaction that compels attention, has 




system response to the ongoing person-situation transaction.” This situation-attention-
appraisal response sequence begins with an internal or external situation that is 
psychologically relevant. Regardless of the nature of the situation, it is attended to in 
various ways that give rise to appraisals that inform the individual’s assessment of the 
situation’s familiarity, valence, and value relevance (Gross & Thompson, 2007). Most 
emotion theorists agree that it is these appraisals in particular that give rise to emotional 
responses.  
 
Core Features of Emotion Regulation  
 
 Individuals regulate both positive and negative emotions internally and externally. 
Emotion regulation occurs at five points: situation selection, situation modification, 
attentional deployment, cognitive change, and response modulation (Gross & Thompson, 
2007). What makes each of these families unique is the point at which they occur in the 
emotion-generative process: the first four are antecedent focused, in that they occur 
before appraisals give rise to full blown emotional response. The fifth occurs after the 







 This is the most forward looking approach to emotion regulation in that it 
involves taking actions that will make it more or less likely that we end up in situations 
that we expect will bring about desirable or undesirable emotions. The biggest issue with 
this approach is that people often profoundly over- or under-estimate the extent to which 
a situation will provoke an emotional response (e.g., overestimating the duration of 
negative emotions). Another relevant drawback to this approach is that individuals often 
focus on short-term benefits instead of long-term costs (e.g., a shy person avoids a social 
situation and feels better in the short-term, but the long-term cost of this is this is social 
isolation).  
 
Situation Modification  
 
Individuals can make efforts to directly modify a situation so as to alter its 
emotional impact. Essentially, situations that can potentially induce an emotional 
response do not always have to elicit an emotional response, at least not to the caliber we 
anticipate. Parents often modify situations for their children in order to reduce the 
likelihood of distressing emotions (e.g., helping with a frustrating game) as well as to 
increase experiences of positive emotion (e.g., planning an elaborate birthday party). In 
adults, situation modification is often in the form of assisting in problem solving or 
confirming the legitimacy of an emotional response in another. At its core, situation 




modifying internal environments in order to produce cognitive change (Gross & 
Thompson, 2007).  
 
Attentional Deployment  
 
It is very possible to regulate emotions without actually altering the physical 
environment. Attentional deployment has to do with how individuals direct their attention 
within a situation in order to influence their emotions. This is considered an internal 
version of situation modification and is used from infancy to adulthood, particularly 
when situation selection and situation modification are not possible. Attentional 
deployment comes in various forms, one being distraction, wherein an individual focuses 
their attention of different aspects of the situation or directs attention away from the 
situation altogether. It can also involve changing internal focus by calling forth thoughts 
or memories that are inconsistent with the undesired emotional state. Concentration is 
somewhat the inverse of distraction, in that it draws attention to emotional features of a 
situation. A well-known maladaptive form of attentional deployment is rumination, 
which involves repetitive focus on feelings associated with distressing events and a 
negative evaluation of their consequences (Bushman, 2002; Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema, 
1990). Not surprisingly, rumination has a strong relationship with depression (Gross & 





Cognitive Change  
 
Even though cognitive change is late in the emotion-generative process, a 
particular emotional response is by no means set in stone. Cognitive change refers to 
altering our appraisal of the situation in order to alter its emotional significance. 
Cognitive change includes changing the way we think about the situation or changing the 
way we think about our capacity to manage the demands it poses. One form of cognitive 
change that has recently gained momentum is reappraisal, the veil of emotion regulation 
that big picture appraisal falls under. Reappraisal involves internally changing the 
meaning of a situation so that it alters its emotional impact. Gross & James (2007) posit 
that over time, reappraisal plays an important role in shaping how an individual views the 
self, others, and the environment.  
 
Response Modulation  
 
As previously mentioned, response modulation occurs after an emotional response 
has been initiated. It thereby refers to an individual’s ability to influence the 
physiological, experiential, or behavioral responding as directly as possible (e.g., drugs, 
exercise, relaxation, alcohol, cigarettes, food). Another form of response modulation is 
expressive suppression, wherein an individual alters his or her external display of 




response modulation—some ways of regulating ones emotions after the emotion has 
occurred may appear maladaptive, but upon consideration of the circumstances it may 
come clear that a “maladaptive” response was actually the only adaptive response to the 
particular situation (e.g., coping with an emotionally abusive family). Furthermore, it is 
important to consider cultural values in determining what constitutes an adaptive or 
maladaptive response (e.g., expressing negative emotion may be viewed by Americans as 
appropriately assertive, but by Nepalese adults as very inappropriate) (Gross & 




 Reappraisal is defined as a form of cognitive change that involves construing a 
potentially emotion-eliciting situation in such a way that it changes its emotional 
influence (Gross & John, 2003; Werner & Gross, 2010). Reappraisal of stressors is 
widely considered an adaptive emotion regulation strategy because 1) it does not demand 
a high level of cognitive resources and 2) because it can alter emotion-generative 
processes at an early stage of processing. Multiple studies have shown reduced 
physiological activity and distress among individuals who reappraise (Gross, 1998). 
Gross & John (2003) have shown that the habitual use of reappraisal to manage emotions 
is associated with higher levels of positive affect and lower levels of negative affect. 




well-being and reappraisers have fewer depressive symptoms and greater self-esteem 
(Gross & John, 2003).  
 Interestingly, reappraisal can also maintain negative emotional states in other 
contexts. One form of maladaptive reappraisal is emotional resistance/non-acceptance of 
one’s current emotional experience (Hayes, Luoma, Bond, Masuda, & Lillis, 2006). This 
type of reappraisal may play an important role in psychopathology, particularly 
surrounding an individual’s beliefs about which emotions are okay to have and which are 
not (Werner & Gross, 2010). Research has found that an unwillingness to experience 
negative emotions and efforts to avoid those negative emotions maintain 
psychopathology (Hayes et al., 2006).  Given this, it is important to tease out which types 
of reappraisal are helpful.  
 
Big Picture Appraisal 
 
 Research thus far has shown that reappraising stressors can be helpful, but 
revealing which types of reappraisals are helpful is still at an early stage of development. 
Several labs have explored one promising approach that consists of reappraising stressors 
in a way that broadens one’s perspective on distressing events and emotions (e.g., Kross 
& Ayduk, 2011; Kross, Ayduk, & Mischel, 2005; Rude, Mazzetti, Pal, & Stauble, 2011; 
Schartau, Dalgleish, & Dunn, 2009). We refer to the appraisal strategies used in these 




situation and one’s reactions to it in ways that transcend or go beyond the immediate 
perspective and view the situation in context. For current purposes, big-picture appraisal 
is operationally defined as maintaining awareness of how a distressing event and/or one’s 
reactions to it fit into one or more larger contexts: (1) an extended time perspective which 
includes an awareness of how emotional states fluctuate and distress tends to dissipate 
with time; (2) the broader context of one’s life, which contains both wanted and 
unwanted experiences; and (3) the broader human context, in which human wants and 
needs are fundamentally similar, and distress and fallibility are universal. 
The idea of considering the broader context in the midst of distress (e.g., 
‘decentering,’ seeing situations from multiple vantage points, and recognizing the 
universality of human experiences and the inevitability of negative experiences) has been 
imbedded in a number of approaches to psychotherapy, including traditional cognitive 
therapy (Beck, 2002; Dalgleish, 2004; Ehlers & Clark, 2000) and mindfulness-based 
variations of cognitive and behavior therapy (Brown & Ryan, 2003; Linehan, 1993; 
Teasdale, Segal, Williams, Ridgeway, Soulsby, & Lau, 2000) but has not been isolated as 




 Kross, Ayduk, and their colleagues (e.g, Kross & Ayduk, 2011) have focused on a 




in that it requires individuals to take a larger perspective by moving away from their 
experience and watching it unfold as if it were happening all over again to a distant 
version of themselves (Kross & Ayduk, 2008). These researchers (2011) found that 
individuals who take this perspective while experiencing negative events or emotions 
experience less distress, lower physiological reactivity, and less rumination as compared 
to control participants instructed to adopt either a self-immersed perspective (e.g. “… 
relive the situation as if it were happening to you all over again” Kross & Ayduk, 2008, 
p. 926) or participants instructed to adopt a distraction strategy.  Kross and Ayduk have 
interpreted self-distancing as helping individuals view distressing events in context, 
which is consistent with big picture appraisal.  
 
Perspective Broadening 
 Additionally, Schartau, Dalgleish, and Dunn (2009) trained participants 
perspective broadening, which consists of four appraisal themes: “Bad things happen—
bad things happen in the world, and I need to put them behind me and move on; Silver 
lining—there are usually some good aspects to every situation, and it is important to 
focus on these; Broader perspective—bad events are rare overall, and lots of good things 
are happening all the time; and Time heals—in the (near) future, this will not seem 
anywhere near as bad as it does now” (Shartau et al., 2009, p. 17). They found that 
participants who were trained in perspective broadening showed lower levels of self-




In a similar study, they asked participants to apply perspective broadening appraisal 
themes to distressing autobiographical memories and found reduced intrusion and 
avoidance of negative memories relative to control participants. Scharteau et al.’s concept 
of perspective broadening also appears to be almost identical to big picture appraisal.  
 Evidence suggests that these types of reappraisal are helpful and could potentially 
lead to higher levels of psychological well-being and lower levels of psychopathology. It 
then becomes important to have a way to measure BPA, and although a self-report 
measure exists, we feel that a processing measure of BPA would contribute unique 
information regarding BPA and our ability to detect it.   
 
PROCESSING MEASURES AND THE SST 
 
A processing measure can be defined simply as a measurement technique that 
assesses attitude on the basis of behavior as opposed to self-assessment. While it is 
unlikely that these types of measures provide an index of implicit attitudes, they could 
nonetheless provide a unique insight into various aspects of the individual (De Houwer, 
2006). Furthermore, it is possible that processing measures are slightly more sensitive 
than self-report measures to detecting deeply held beliefs or attitudes that aren’t active 
during the moment of measurement. In order to understand how a processing measure of 
BPA (in this case, the SST-BPA) would potentially be able to bypass self-distortion and 




distressing events or emotions, one must first understand the origin and development of 
the original Scrambled Sentences Test, an established processing measure designed to 
detect cognitive vulnerability to depression (SST; Wenzlaff & Bates, 1998).  
 
Development of the Original SST 
 
It is well established that depressed individuals tend to focus their attention on 
unhappy and unflattering information, to interpret ambiguous information negatively, and 
to harbor pervasively pessimistic beliefs (e.g., Hamilton & Abramson, 1983; Hollon, 
Kendall & Lumry, 1986; Krantz & Rude, 1984; Rude, Krantz, & Rosenhan, 1988). 
However, these information-processing biases are also easily explained as symptoms or 
effects of depression (e.g. Coyne & Gotlib, 1983; Hammen, Marks, deMayo, & Mayol, 
1985).  
Countering the claim that information-processing biases observed in depression 
are nothing more than a concomitant of depression, cognitive depression theorists such as 
Beck (e.g. Beck, 1967) posit that negatively biased schemata of self, world, and future 
bring about the symptoms and phenomenology of clinical depression. Depressive 
schemata are presumed to become latent upon symptomatic recovery from a depressive 
episode, yet to remain available, constituting a vulnerability to subsequent episodes of 
depression (Rude, Covich, Jarrold, Hedlund, & Zentner; 2001). Even though an 




depressive schemata that could potentially be reactivated upon experiencing a stressful 
life event and propel the individual into another depressive episode.  
Over the past two decades, in order to either explain or reject Beck’s (1967) 
theory, an important goal of depression researchers has been to clarify the role of 
underlying depressive schemata and negative cognitive biases in bringing about 
depressive episodes. In order to do this, researchers would need to show group 
differences in depressive biases between formerly-depressed and never-depressed 
individuals. Researchers focused on these two groups because never-depressed 
individuals are presumed to be mostly free of depressive biases (and therefore at low-risk 
for depression) and formerly-depressed individuals could potentially harbor these 
depressive biases (and therefore be at-risk for depression). The hypothesis was that 
formerly-depressed individuals would show higher scores on measures of depressive 
thinking than never-depressed individuals in order to prove that negative cognitive biases 
play a role in the development and maintenance of depression. 
While a large body of research successfully established that currently-depressed 
individuals show negatively biased information processing, it was initially more difficult 
to detect these specific group differences of depressive biases in never-depressed and 
formerly-depressed individuals. Both never-depressed and formerly-depressed 
individuals consistently scored similarly on self-report measures of depressive thinking 
(e.g. Bradley & Matthews, 1988; Eaves & Rush, 1984; Gotlib & Cane, 1987; Hamilton & 




Wilkinson & Blackburn, 1981). This finding didn’t support Beck’s claim that cognitive 
biases play an important role in depression as hypothesized. In order to explain this 
difficulty, Hedlund and Rude (1995) suggested that an additional reason that detection of 
depressive biases among formerly-depressed individuals has been elusive may be the use 
of relatively insensitive (self-report questionnaire) measures of depressive thinking in 
most studies.  
Consistent with existing research, Hedlund and Rude (1995) found that formerly 
and never-depressed individuals did not differ on two widely used questionnaire 
measures of depressive thinking, the Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale (DAS; Weissman & 
Beck, 1978) and the Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire (ATQ; Hollon & Kendall, 1980). 
However, these groups did differ on a processing measure of interpretation: formerly 
depressed participants produced more negative solutions on the Scrambled Sentences 
Test (SST; Wenzlaff, 1993). These results suggested that the SST was potentially 
sensitive enough to tap into elusive processes and detect underlying depressive biases.  
Importantly, the scrambled sentences that the measure consists of are traditionally 
administered in two separate sets (e.g., in blocks of 10 to 20) to participants—one set 
under a time limit (e.g., three minutes) and a cognitive load and one set only under a time 
limit. The 6-digit number is shown to participants for a few seconds directly prior to 
beginning the task, and they are asked to hold the number in memory while unscrambling 
the sentences and to write it down when time is up. Ideally, participants feel that 




of cognitive resources to keeping it in mind. Although both ways of administering the 
scrambled sentences are thought to reduce volitional control in responding (i.e., the act of 
unscrambling sentences also uses up cognitive resources) the addition of a cognitive load 
in the form of a 6-digit number functions to further decrease an individual’s capacity to 
unscramble sentences in a manner that is consistent with how one wishes to be viewed.  
Researchers hypothesized that the score for the set of sentences that were 
administered only under a time limit would be more correlated with questionnaire scores 
and not be as sensitive to detecting group discrepancies in depressive thinking (Hedlund 
& Rude, 1995). On the other hand, the score for the set of sentences administered under a 
cognitive load and a time limit would presumably 1) differ from the score for the set of 
sentences administered with no load and 2) be less correlated with questionnaire 
measures, because it would ideally be more sensitive to detecting depressive biases. 
Rude, Valdez, Odom, & Ebrahimi (2003) found these differences in the load and no-load 
version of the measure, with the load version being a stronger predictor of subsequent 
depression.  
 
The Uniqueness of Processing Measures and the SST 
 
There are many possible reasons that a processing measure like the SST could 
access depressive biases, or underlying cognitive processes in general, whereas self-




explore the nature of questionnaire measures. Questionnaires are particularly susceptible 
to distortion because they are self-report in nature and presumably require a high degree 
of psychological awareness on the part of the respondent to be of use to the researcher. 
Robinson and Neighbors (2012) suggest that self-report measures capture the mind as an 
object of self-reflection while processing measures capture the mind in action.  
Given that the SST is a processing measure, evidence suggests that it may be 
more sensitive to detecting formerly elusive cognitive processes, whether those processes 
are related to depressive thinking or styles of emotion regulation. This is likely because 
the SST is more reflective of individuals’ true attitudes because they do not have the 
cognitive capacity necessary to “choose” their answers as they would in a self-report 
measure. In support of these hypotheses, Hedlund and Rude’s study (1995) where group 
differences between never-depressed and formerly-depressed individuals were found 
using the SST was followed by numerous later studies that continued to produce similar 
and even more striking results (Rude et al., 2001; Rude, Valdez, Odom, & Ebrahimi, 
2003).   
Rude et al. (2001) again found that differences is depressive thinking as a function 
of depressive history (never-depressed and formerly-depressed) were revealed by two 
laboratory tests, but not by the questionnaires. Rude et al. (2003) found that SST scores 
(proportion of negative solutions) in the cognitive load condition predicted diagnoses of 
major depression during an 18-28 month follow-up period. No significant prediction of 




study (Rude, Durham-Fowler, Baum, & Maestas, 2010) repeated this procedure and 
found that a self-report measure, the Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale (Weissman and Beck, 
1978), and a cognitive processing test, the Scrambled Sentences Test (Wenzlaff, 1993), 
each contributed significantly to predicting a subsequent diagnosis of MDD.  
Evidence from these studies suggests that processing measures are particularly 
sensitive to the unique processes generated by each individual (Barton, S., Morley, S., 
Bloxham, G., Kitson, C., Platts, S., 2005). Robinson & Neighbors (2012) go on to argue 
that performance measure cannot be faked as easily, or at least not in any obvious way, 
which makes them an ideal “check” on conscious patterns of self endorsement). 
Supporting the theory behind the SST and detection of depressive biases, Robinson & 
Neighbors (2012) posit that processing measures should not be seen as tapping into the 
same constructs, or aspects of the person, as those tapped by self-report measures.  
This could also explain why scores on the SST typically do not correlate highly 
with self-report measures of depressive thinking and why it is difficult to establish 
convergent validity for the SST-BPA. The only other measure of BPA (BPAQ; Gill, 
2014) is self-report in nature, meaning it could be accessing different parts of the 
individual than the SST-BPA. It makes sense, then, that the SST-BPA and the BPAQ do 
not show as strong of a correlation as would be expected of two alternate measures of the 
same construct (Campbell & Fiske, 1959). Furthermore, it is inherently difficult to 
produce adequate reliability and validity for a processing measure (for a discussion, see 




threat do not tend to be correlated (Kindt & Brosschot, 1998; Mogg, McNamara, Powys, 
Rawlinson, Seiffer, & Bradley, 2000). Given this, the correlation between the alternate 




 The present study aims to integrate the theory behind emotion regulation, big 
picture appraisal, and processing measures in order to produce a Scrambled Sentences 
Test for Big Picture Appraisal that contributes unique information to the construct of 





















Although there has been considerable recent interest in the types of appraisals that 
are effective in regulating emotion, measurement of these appraisal styles is lacking. The 
current paper focuses on a distinct type of appraisal, big picture appraisal, and presents a 
new measure of this appraisal style. We define big picture appraisal as viewing a difficult 
situation and one’s reactions to it in ways that transcend or go beyond the immediate 
perspective and that consider the situation in context. More specifically, big picture 
appraisal is defined as maintaining awareness of how a distressing event and/or one’s 
reactions to it fit into: (1) an extended time perspective which includes an awareness of 
how emotional states fluctuate and distress tends to dissipate with time; (2) the broader 
context of one’s life pursuits, in which there are typically alternate routes to meet one’s 
most important goals, and sometimes unexpected benefits of setbacks, (3) the broader 
human context, in which human wants and needs are fundamentally similar, and distress 
and fallibility are universal (Rude, Gill, Miller, & Haner, 2013).  
Supporting the concept and usefulness of big picture appraisal, Rude, Mazzetti, 
Pal, and Stauble (2011) found that college students who reported a recent interpersonal 
rejection experienced lower levels of rumination after receiving an experimental big 
picture intervention (i.e., writing in response to probe questions that encouraged 
considering how they would feel about the experience in 1-2 years, how their responses 




situation) as compared to either of two control interventions (writing about the reasons 
for the events and their reactions to it or not writing about their experience at all). Further 
support comes from a study by Miller, Rude, and Haner (in press) in which a bias toward 
big picture appraisal was trained implicitly, using cognitive bias modification techniques 
(e.g., MacLeod & Mathews, 2012). In the Miller et al. (in press) study, training resulted 
in the expected group differences on an early version of the measure studied here, the 
Scrambled Sentences Test for Big Picture Appraisal (SST-BPA), as well as a trend 
toward greater emotional balance (lower negative mood) following a stressor in the big 
picture as compared to the control condition.  
Several other research programs have shown the benefits of taking a larger 
perspective, including Schartau, Dalgleish, and Dunn (2009) who proposed the 
importance of perspective broadening. In a series of studies, participants encouraged to 
practice accepting that bad things happen, finding a silver lining, taking a broader 
perspective, and remembering that time heals,  showed lower levels of self-reported 
negative emotion and electrodermal responses after watching a series of distressing films 
than control participants. Additionally, Kross and Ayduk (e.g. Kross & Ayduk, 2011; 
Kross & Ayduk, 2008; Ayduk & Kross, 2010) have found that individuals instructed to 
take a self-distanced perspective on a distressing event (e.g. “…take a few steps back and 
move away from your experience…watch the experience unfold as if it were happening 
all over again to the distant you…” Kross & Ayduk, 2008, p. 926) experienced less 




self-immersed perspective (e.g. “… relive the situation as if it were happening to you all 
over again” Kross & Ayduk, 2008, p. 926) or who adopted a distraction strategy.  
  Given research interest in emotion regulation strategies such as big picture 
appraisal (BPA), developing a measure of BPA could be useful for research as well as for 
practical applications. Currently, a self-report measure of BPA (BPAQ; Gill, 2014) is in 
development, and although this type of measure is needed, self-report measures are 
inherently vulnerable to particular types of distortions that can be explained by a number 
of relatively natural tendencies—including self-deceptive positivity and a desire to 
respond in a socially desirable manner (Paulhus & Jon, 1998; Shedler, Mayman, & 
Manis, 1993). Furthermore, considerable evidence indicates that individuals do not have 
full access to their own cognitive processes (e.g., Nisbett and Wilson, 1977) and 
consequently cannot self-report with complete accuracy. These tendencies can detract 
from the validity of self-report measures. A performance measure such as the measure 
described here, which assumes that many of a person’s most important tendencies are 
revealed only by observing how they are enacted, may be able to bypass these problems 
that are often seen in self-report measures and therefore get a “truer” or more dynamic 
picture of a person’s attitude (Robinson & Neighbors, 2012).  
 The current paper describes the development and preliminary validation of 
a performance measure of BPA, the Scrambled Sentences Test for Big Picture Appraisal, 
wherein participants unscramble sentences under time pressure to yield coherent 




modeled after an established measure of depressive biases, the Scrambled Sentences Test 
(SST; Wenzlaff, 1988, 1993, 1998), which has shown evidence of superiority to self-
report measures in distinguishing individuals with and without a history of depression 
(Hedlund & Rude, 1995; Rude, Covich, Jarrold, Hedlund, & Zentner, 2001) and of 
predicting the occurrence of depression prospectively (Rude, Odom, Valdez, & Ebrahimi, 
2003; Rude, Durham-Fowler, Baum, Rooney, & Maestas, 2010).  
In three separate data collections the reliability and validity of the SST-BPA was 
assessed. Study 1 examined the content validity of the draft SST-BPA items, and Study 2 
and Study 3 assessed the internal consistency and convergent-discriminant validity of the 
measure. Whereas Study 2 used a paper and pencil implementation, parallel to that used 
with the original SST, Study 3 examined the psychometric properties of a computerized 
implementation of the SST-BPA.  
Development of the SST-BPA  
 The format and structure of the SST-BPA is identical to the original scrambled 
sentences test. As in the original SST, items developed for the SST-BPA were groups of 
6 words that respondents unscramble by placing numbers above each of five of the words 
to reflect the chosen word ordering. A non emotional example used in instructions for the 
task is, “hot water cold is sometimes very”), which can be unscrambled to form the 
sentences, “water is sometimes very hot” or “water is sometimes very cold.” The way a 
person unscrambles a sentence is thought to indicate the meanings that are most 




(depressive or non depressive in the original SST) divided by the total sentences 
completed. To further decrease the use of volitional control in responding, items can be 
administered under cognitive load (maintaining a 6-digit number in memory while 
completing the items). The 6-digit number is briefly presented to subjects directly prior to 
unscrambling a block of sentences, and at the end of each block participants are asked to 
write the six-digit number in the space provided.  
 A large pool of preliminary items was constructed by the authors. Items were 
developed to reflect the three key dimensions of BPA as described above: an extended 
time perspective, the broader context of life, and the broader human context (Rude et al., 
2013). Potential items were reviewed and revised by the authors and colleagues for 
clarity and consistency with the BPA concept, and 40 items were selected as meeting 
initial criteria with the anticipation that poorly functioning items could be removed later 




 The purpose of Study 1 was to establish the content validity of the draft SST-BPA 
items. The interest was in the degree to which solutions to the items were judged to 
actually reflect the researchers’ definition of big picture appraisal.  
Sample and Procedures 




psychology graduate students, participants first read a written description of the big 
picture construct (“Big picture appraisal is defined as individuals’ ability to 
see their current distress in a larger context. This means that in the face of situations 
going badly and when feeling difficult emotions, they are able to have a larger 
perspective on themselves and their situation—to see “the big picture.” This would 
include being able to realize that feelings come and go and that distress doesn’t last 
indefinitely. It would also involve viewing the distressing event or emotions within the 
broader context of their life. It might involve realizing that life has many aspects and that 
they are not alone in their distress. The opposite of this kind of thinking is having mental 
“blinders” on during a distressing event and not being able to see anything but the 
distress—not being able to see the other pieces of the puzzle”) and then judged how much 
the big picture and the non-big picture solutions for each item captured big picture 
thinking. The complete set of items was divided into two subsets and administered in 
separate surveys to minimize fatigue effects, since the number of statements to rate was 
large (two for each of the 40 scrambled sentence items). Administration was randomized 
with an equal number of participants receiving each survey. Within each survey, the big 
picture and non big picture solution for each item were intermixed so that the solutions 
for a given item did not appear close together. Participants rated each solution on how 
much it expressed a view that took the big picture into account, 1 being “not at all” and 5 
being “very much.” 




 For ease of interpretation, the original response scale of 1 to 5 is presented here as -
2 to 2, with a midpoint of zero so that negative numbers reflect mean ratings below the 
scale midpoint, suggesting the item is not judged as reflecting big picture appraisal, 
whereas positive numbers reflect means above the scale midpoint, suggesting the item is 
judged as reflecting this construct. The first column in Table 1 shows that the mean 
ratings of all big picture solutions were positive (more reflective of big picture thinking) 
and the second column shows that the mean ratings of all but five non-big picture 
solutions were negative (less reflective of big picture thinking). These five items were 
omitted from further analysis in Study 2 and Study 3 due to not being clearly reflective of 
either big picture or non-big picture thinking. Thus the results suggested that the 




 Study 2 sought to establish psychometric properties of the SST-BPA by 
administering it to a large sample of undergraduates, along with measures of similar and 
dissimilar constructs. The SST-BPA was administered using the traditional paper and 
pencil format as described below. In some uses of the original SST, items are often 
administered under cognitive load (asking participants to hold a 6 digit number in mind 
while completing the task). In the current study we were initially interested in exploring 




half of the BPA-SST items were administered under load and half without (order 
counterbalanced). Correlations of total SST-BPA scores with related and unrelated 
measures were used to assess convergent-discriminant validity. These measures included 
the self-report big picture questionnaire that is currently under development, a measure of 
self-compassion, emotion regulation, and a measure of the big five personality 
dimensions (all described below). 
  Our predictions for how SST-BPA scores would correlate with other 
measures was as follows: Since big picture thinking is thought to help regulate negative 
emotion, we expected to see a low inverse correlation with the use of an alternative 
emotion regulation strategy that has been demonstrated to be relatively ineffective (Gross 
& John, 2003), emotion suppression. We expected a relatively high degree of association 
with self-compassion because the theory of self-compassion (see Neff, 2003) emphasizes 
the idea of human interconnection and of viewing one’s difficulties from an optimal 
distance, ideas that are similar to two key aspects of big picture thinking. We expected a 
positive association with reported tendency to use reappraisal as an emotion regulation 
strategy because we conceptualize big picture thinking as a type of reappraisal. Because 
we view big picture thinking as an effective emotion regulation strategy, we expected it 
to be moderately negatively related to neuroticism. We expected low to moderate positive 
relationships between big picture thinking and the remaining “big five” personality 
dimensions of agreeableness, conscientiousness, openness, and extraversion. John, 




a tendency to be altruistic and sympathetic, which we suspect may naturally emerge from 
a sense of feeling connected to others. Our expectations for conscientiousness, openness 
to experience, and extraversion were less certain but we thought big picture thinking 
might show a low to moderate positive correlation with conscientiousness, as 
conscientiousness in this sense is described as the tendency to think before acting (John et 
al., 2008), which could be associated with considering the context of distressing events 
and/or one’s emotional reactions. A low to moderate positive association with openness 
to experience seemed possible as this construct reflects a generally curious and reflective 
outlook (John et al., 2008), which might be expected to yield a big picture perspective; 
and a similar association with extraversion seemed possible, as this construct 
encompasses positive emotionality (John et al., 2008) and because it seems conceptually 
linked to feeling connected with others, an important aspect of big picture thinking.  
 Finally, we anticipated the strongest association to be between the SST-BPA and 
the self-report measure of big picture appraisal (BPAQ; Gill, 2014) because it purports to 
measure the same construct. However, given the fairly significant differences in the 
structure and content of the two measures, the association was not expected to be as high 
as it would be between two self-report measures of the same construct.  
Method 
Sample and Procedures  
 Undergraduates at The University of Texas at Austin (N=205, 58% women) were 




exchange for completing the survey. Participants self-identified as being of the following 
descents: Hispanic (N=60), African-American/Black (N=3), Asian (N=47), European  
(N=122), Multiracial (N=9) and other (N=8). Participants ranged in age from 18 to 46 
with an average age of 21.  
 Participants first completed the SST-BPA in groups of 3-6 people. After completing 
the SST-BPA, participants were directed to a computer lab in which they completed an 
online survey consisting of a measure of big picture appraisal, the big 5 personality traits, 
self-compassion, and emotion regulation, respectively (described below). The entire 
session took approximately 40 minutes to complete.  
Instruments 
 Scrambled Sentences Test for Big Picture Appraisal (SST-BPA).   Participants 
completed one of two alternate forms (randomly determined) of the SST-BPA. In both 
forms, items were administered in blocks of ten and participants were given 1.5 minutes 
to unscramble each block. The only difference in the forms was the ordering of items 
(i.e., item 1 in the first form became item 40 in the second, item 2 became item 39, and so 
on) and whether the first two blocks or second two blocks of items were completed under 
cognitive load.  Table 1 lists the items in the order they appeared on one of the two forms. 
Like the original SST, scoring of the SST-BPA is done by judges. In this case, judges 
were undergraduate and graduate students who received training (e.g., practice exercises, 
expert feedback) in scoring the SST-BPA prior to the study. While many of the solutions 




unanticipated ways that still convey a big picture or a non-big picture meaning and are 
therefore scorable. Solutions are considered unscorable if the sequence of words does not 
form a grammatically correct sentence (e.g., “fear can I learn from”) or if the sentence 
formed is neither a clear big picture or non big picture solution, or if (contrary to 
instructions), it forms a question (e.g., “can I learn from fear”). Each item was 
independently scored by two judges and inter-rater reliability was high (r = .96). Any 
scoring discrepancies that occurred were resolved by discussion between judges and the 
first author.  
 Demographic Questionnaire. The authors included questions about age, sex, and 
racial group.  
The Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ; Gross & John, 2003) consists of 
ten items designed to assess individual differences in the habitual use of two emotion 
regulation strategies: cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppression. Items are rated 
on a 7-point scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. Examples of 
suppression items include “I keep my emotions to myself” and “I control my emotions by 
not expressing them,” and examples of reappraisal items include “When I want to feel a 
more positive emotion (such as joy and amusement), I change what I’m thinking about” 
and “I control my emotions by changing the way I’m thinking about the situation I’m in.” 
Alpha-levels for the suppression subscale and the reappraisal subscale were .73 and .79, 
respectively. Test-retest reliability across three months was .69 for both subscales (Gross 




 The Big Five Inventory (BFI; John, Donahue, & Kentle, 1991; John, Naumann, & 
Soto, 2008) is a 44-item self-report measure of the five major facets of personality, which 
include extraversion (e.g., “I am someone who is talkative, full of energy”), 
agreeableness (e.g., “I am someone who is relaxed, handles stress well”), 
conscientiousness (e.g., “I am someone who is a reliable worker, organized”), 
neuroticism (e.g., “I am someone who worries a lot, can be tense”), and openness (e.g., “I 
am someone who has an active imagination, is curious”). Items are rated on a scale of 1 
to 5, ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” Internal consistencies for each 
sub-scale are as follows: extraversion, .86; agreeableness, .79; conscientiousness, .82; 
neuroticism, .87; and openness, .83 (John et al., 2008).  
The Self-Compassion Scale (SCS; Neff, 2003) is a self-report measure designed to 
assess one’s level of self-compassion. It consists of 26 items that were written to fall into 
three categories: self-kindness (i.e. “I try to feel loving towards myself when I am in 
emotional pain), common humanity (i.e. “When things are going badly for me, I see the 
difficulties as part of life that everyone goes through”), and mindfulness (i.e. “When 
something upsets me I try to keep my emotions in balance”). However, use of the total 
score has been recommended (Neff, 2009). The measure was found to have a high level 
of internal consistency with a Cronbach’s alpha of .92 (Neff, 2003).  
The Big Picture Appraisal Questionnaire (BPAQ; Gill, 2014) is a self-report 
measure consisting of 23 likert type items. Instructions ask respondents to indicate how 




awareness of extended time perspective, commonality of human experience, inevitability 
of unwanted life experiences, and the possibility for growth and learning from adversity. 
However, exploratory factor analysis indicates a single factor. Although this measure is 
still in development, preliminary data indicate acceptable convergent-discriminant 
validity and internal consistency with alpha = .90 (Gill et al., 2013).      
 Results and Discussion  
Item Statistics. Because scoring of each individual SST-BPA item is dichotomous, 
internal consistency reliability was assessed using point-biserial item-total correlations 
rather than Cronbach’s alpha. Table 1 shows the item-total correlations and the frequency 
of big picture and non-big picture solutions for each item. As can be seen from the table, 
the n for each item ranged considerably. This is an expected result of the timed format in 
which many participants aren’t able to complete items presented closer to the end of a 
block. A widely used rule of thumb for acceptable levels for item-total correlations is .2 
or .3 (Everitt, B., 2002). SST-BPA item-total correlations ranged from .25 to .63, with the 
exception of five items (item 4, r = .09; item 6, r = .16; item 7, r = .07; item 27, r = .13; 
item 36, r = .10). These five items were subsequently omitted from the item-total because 
they did not appear to be reliably measuring the same construct as other items in the 
block. Importantly, the relatively high rate of unscorable solutions for item 4 (21%) and 7 
(26%) likely contributed to their lack of correlation with item totals.  
 The fifth column of Table 1 presents the percentage distribution of big picture and 




percentages and 100 indicates the percent of unscorable solutions for each. The majority 
of items weren’t solved in one way too frequently, indicating that these items were able 
to discriminate fairly well between appraisal styles. However, item 32 received zero non 
big picture responses, raising questions about its ability to discriminate styles. It was 
subsequently omitted from the pool of items.  
Table 1 shows item-total correlations in column 3 only for the 29 items that were used in 
calculations.  
 Validity of Total Scores. For the remaining 29 items, three separate SST-BPA 
scores (ratios) were calculated: A ratio corresponding to 1) items completed under a load, 
2) items completed without a load, and 3) both types of items combined). Scores were 
calculated by creating a ratio of the number of big picture solutions over total items 
completed correctly (i.e., excluding error solutions), as has been done in previous studies 
using the original SST (e.g., Rude et al., 2003). For items completed under load, means 
for the number of big picture solutions, total items completed, and ratio (with standard 
deviations in parenthesis) were 5.33 (3.36), 8.00 (4.14), and .65 (.23), respectively. For 
items completed without load, means (with standard deviations in parenthesis) for the 
number of big picture solutions, total items completed, and ratio were 5.86 (3.93), 7.89 
(4.25), and .72 (.21), respectively. 
Table 2 presents correlations relevant to assessing convergent and discriminant 
validity. Correlations of each measure with the portions of the SST-BPA administered 




correlations does not appear to vary in general as a function of load administration, only 
correlations with the combined version of the SST-BPA will be discussed.  As can be 
seen, the pattern of correlations is generally consistent with predictions. As expected, the 
SST-BPA was moderately associated with the Self Compassion Scale (SCS) and the Big 
Picture Appraisal Questionnaire (BPAQ). Although SST-BPA is more associated with 
the BPAQ than the SCS,  the correlation with the BPAQ was not quite as high as was 
hoped. The SST-BPA was somewhat associated with the reappraisal subscale of the 
Emotion Regulation Questionnaire but less so than expected, and it was mildly to 
moderately associated with the agreeableness, extraversion, conscientiousness, and 
openness subscales of the Big Five Inventory (BFI-A; BFI-E; BFI-C; BFI-O). As 
anticipated, it showed relatively little association with the neuroticism subscale (BFI-N), 
but it was moderately inversely correlated with neuroticism when administered under a 
cognitive load. Although we expected an inverse correlation with the expressive 
suppression subscale of the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ-S) the correlation 
was essentially zero, indicating that the two constructs are relatively unassociated.  
 
STUDY 3 
 Study 3 was nearly identical to Study 2 in structure and purpose but had the 
additional goal of evaluating the psychometric properties of a computer administration of 
the SST-BPA. Instead of writing the numbers 1 through 5 below each word to indicate 




participants with each scrambled sentence and instructed them to type the numbers 1 
through 5 in a text box below each word to indicate ordering. Items were presented to all 
participants in the order they appear on Table 1 and participants were given 1.5 minutes 
to unscramble each block of ten sentences. Half of the participants completed the first 
two blocks of items under load and the other half completed the last two blocks of items 
under load. Pilot testing indicated that respondents found this administration/response 
format manageable but somewhat more demanding of effort than the paper and pencil 
format. Predictions for the pattern of correlations were the same as described above for 
Study 2. In addition, we included a measure of social desirability that we expected to be 
essentially uncorrelated with the SST-BPA, especially when administered under a 
cognitive load.  
 
Method  
Sample and Procedures 
 Undergraduates at The University of Texas at Austin (N=540, 63% women) were 
recruited from an Educational Psychology subject pool and received class credit in 
exchange for completing the survey. Participants self-identified as being of the following 
descents: Hispanic (N=146), African-American/Black (N=4), Asian (N=102), European  
(N=257), Middle Eastern (N=9), Multiracial (N=12) and other (N=10). Participants 
ranged in age from 18 to 56 with an average age of 21.  




40 minutes to complete. Participants completed the same measures used in Study 2 (see 
above for descriptions) but the order of administration was different. Participants first 
completed a measure of big picture appraisal, social desirability, and big 5 personality 
traits before completing the SST-BPA. Then, participants completed measures of self-
compassion and emotion regulation. 
Instruments  
 The Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale- Short Form C (MC-C; Reynolds; 
1982) is 13-item shortened form of the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale 
(MCSD; Crowne & Marlowe, 1960). The MCSD is used as an adjunct measure of the 
impact of social desirability on self-report instruments. Items are answered either “true” 
or “false” and examples of items include “I can remember playing sick to get out of 
something” and “I am always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable.”  Items are 
summed for the total score (5-items are reverse scored), with increasing scores reflecting 
participants’ desire to answer in a more socially acceptable manner. It has been found to 
have good internal consistency (KR-20=.76; Reynolds, 1982).  
Results and Discussion  
Item Statistics. As indicated in Table 1, analyses of Study 3 data yielded a similar 
pattern to that observed for Study 2 for item-total correlations and distribution of 
responses for each item and provided further evidence for the adequacy of these items. 
The full set of 40 items was administered in Study 3 in order to compare item 




exception of three items (e.g., item 4, r = .10; item 7, r = -.07; item 14, r = .12). Whereas 
items 4 and 7 showed similarly low item-total correlations in Study 2, item 14 performed 
fairly well in Study 2. However, based on Study 3 reliability, item 14 was also omitted. 
This resulted in a final pool of 28 items.   
 As in Study 2, the timed design of the measure contributed to large variability in the 
number of responses to each item but this variability was considerably larger in Study 3 
than in Study 2 because only a single item ordering was used in Study 3. Because of the 
single item ordering each item in a block of ten items typically received fewer responses 
than the item before it. This can be seen in the pattern of Ns shown in parentheses in the 
5th column in Table 1.  
Column 6 shows that, as in Study 2, the items vary in their ability to discriminate 
between different degrees of big picture thinking. Only item 22 showed a markedly 
skewed response pattern, with only 2 non big picture responses. The six items (items 7, 
14, 15, 26, 32, and 36) that showed high rates (25%) of unscorable solutions in Study 2 
performed similarly in Study 3, with six additional items (items 8, 9, 10, 19, 30, and 38) 
also yielding unscorable solutions more than 25% of the time. Importantly, all of these 
items were each at the end of a set of sentences and increased time pressure could have 
been partially responsible for the number of unscorable solutions.  
Validity of Total Scores. As in Study 2, total SST-BPA scores were created 
separately for the half of the items each participant had completed under load and the half 




number of big picture solutions over total items completed correctly (i.e., excluding error 
solutions). For items completed under load, means (with standard deviations in 
parenthesis) for the number of big picture solutions, total items completed, and ratio were 
8.02 (3.55), 10.52 (3.65), and .77 (.18), respectively. For items completed without load, 
means for the number of big picture solutions, total items completed, and ratio were 8.02 
(3.55), 10.51 (3.65), and .75 (.20), respectively.  
As can be seen in the third through sixth columns of Table 2, the pattern of 
correlations with other measures was similar to that observed for Study 2 and generally 
consistent with predictions. As in Study 2, the SST-BPA showed a moderate positive 
association with the BPAQ and the SCS and no association with the ERQ-S.  It showed 
similar associations with the BFI subscales as in Study 2, with the exception of being 
essentially uncorrelated with BFI conscientiousness when administered under cognitive 
load and showing a moderate inverse association with the BFI-N both when administered 
with a cognitive load and without. The SST-BPA was slightly more correlated with the 
ERQ-R than in Study 2 and showed a mild positive association with social desirability 
when administered without a cognitive load, but the correlation became essentially zero 
with the introduction of the cognitive load, suggesting that the cognitive load may further 
limit the use of volitional control in the SST-BPA.  
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 




Sentences Test of Big Picture Appraisal (SST-BPA) is psychometrically sound and a 
valid measure of big picture thinking. Big picture appraisal views difficult life 
circumstances within a broader context that considers alternate avenues to goal 
fulfillment in the face of setbacks as well as positive aspects of adverse situations, 
commonality with experiences of other people, and a relatively large time perspective. 
Recent evidence indicates that big picture appraisal (Miller et al., in press; Rude et al., 
2011) as well as similar appraisal strategies such as perspective broadening (Schartau et 
al., 2009) and self-distancing (Kross & Ayduk, 2008, 2011; Ayduk & Kross, 2010) are 
beneficial in the regulation of emotion. While a number of recent experimental studies 
have supported the benefits of these approaches, very little work has addressed the 
measurement of individual differences in adaptive appraisal strategies. Present results 
indicate that the SST-BPA will be a useful tool for the investigation of big picture 
appraisal.  
Study 1 established the content validity of the SST-BPA by assessing the degree 
to which item solutions appear to reflect big picture appraisal. Overall, item solutions 
were rated in the expected direction (i.e., positively for big picture and negatively for 
non-big picture). The fact that judges who had no prior knowledge of big picture 
appraisal, using only a brief description of the construct, rated the solutions consistently 
with the intended big picture and non big picture solutions for each item lends important 
support for our claim to have tapped into big picture appraisal as we have described it.  




Notably, measures were administered in a different order in Studies 2 and 3 and the SST-
BPA may have effects, such as decreased attentional resources or negative distress, which 
may influence participants’ responses to measures that follow the SST-BPA in Studies 2 
and 3. Furthermore, Study 2 was administered on paper and Study 3 on a computer. 
Despite these two differences, the results in both studies were similar. Across both 
studies, the vast majority of items demonstrated adequate internal consistency, and items 
that performed especially well in Study 2 also tended to perform well in Study 3. 
Analyses also revealed that the there is an adequate spread between big picture and non-
big picture responses for the majority of items, suggesting that items are able to 
discriminate fairly well between appraisal styles.  
For six items across both Studies 2 and 3, item-total correlations were less than 
the widely used threshold of .2 or .3 (Everitt, B., 2002). While this may be a limitation 
for these items, it may also be due to the fact that performance measures are especially 
sensitive to the unique responses generated by each individual (Barton, Morley, 
Bloxham, Kitson, & Platts, 2005) and consequently it is more difficult to obtain adequate 
psychometric properties for performance than self-report measures. For example, word 
fragment completion measures rarely approach the internal consistency of self-report 
tests (Buchner & Wippich, 2000; McCleland, 1987). Nonetheless, these items were 
omitted from the final pool of items, along with five items that did not demonstrate 
adequate content validity and one item that did not discriminate between appraisal styles 




were omitted, leaving a final number of 28 items with acceptable psychometric 
properties.  
 As anticipated, the SST-BPA was the most correlated with the BPAQ and the SCS, 
since the former purports to measure the same construct and the latter shares fundamental 
similarities with BPA, like common humanity. The association between the SST-BPA 
and BPAQ suggests that the measures are moderately related to one another but less so 
than one might expect of alternate measures of the same construct. This might be because 
they utilize vastly different measurement techniques, and more specifically because 
performance tests are generally not highly correlated with other measures of the same 
construct (e.g, different measures of attention to threat do not tend to be correlated) 
(Kindt & Brosschot, 1998; Mogg et al., 2000; Cunningham, Preacher, & Banaji, 2001). 
Robinson & Neighbors (2012) suggest that this might be partially because performance 
measures can often bypass the distortion (i.e, self-deceptive positivity, social desirability) 
that arises in self-report measures. Given this, the present correlation between alternate 
measures appears acceptable. Importantly, the weak to non-existent associations between 
the SST-BPA and the measure of social desirability suggest that these findings are not 
due to participants answering the big picture appraisal items in either a socially desirable 
or undesirable manner, particularly in when the measure is administered under cognitive 
load.  
 Given that BPA is a unique construct that falls under the broader category of 




ERQ, reappraisal is conceptualized as the tendency to change ones thoughts in order to 
change ones feelings (e.g., “When I want to feel a more positive emotion, I change what 
I’m thinking about) (Gross & John, 2003). BPA is distinct from this form of reappraisal 
in that it focuses on considering the context of distressing situations and emotions as 
opposed to changing ones thoughts in a broader sense.  We also anticipated an inverse 
association between the SST-BPA and expressive suppression because it is considered an 
ineffective way of regulating emotions; however, the two measures were uncorrelated in 
both Study 2 and Study 3, providing adequate evidence that the two constructs are 
unrelated. This makes sense, given that BPA emphasizes the internal regulation of 
emotions via reappraisal of the meaning of distressing thoughts, feelings, and situations 
and expressive suppression emphasizes the regulation of external displays of emotion, 
suggesting that the two constructs address different aspects of emotion regulation. 
 The SST-BPA showed a range of relationships with the subscales of the BFI. As 
predicted, it was minimally to moderately correlated with neuroticism (inversely) and 
extraversion, suggesting that individuals who often experience positive emotions, 
enthusiasm, and energy and who are emotionally stable tend to view their distressing 
experiences in terms of the bigger picture. Given that an important component of BPA is 
common humanity, the minimal to moderate relationship with agreeableness was 
tentatively expected since agreeableness (altruism, prosocial behavior) may naturally 
stem from a sense of feeling connected to others (John et al., 2008). The minimal to 




BPA involves taking a step back to consider the context of distressing situations and/or 
emotions and conscientiousness is defined as thinking before acting (John et al., 2008). 
Lastly, openness and BPA were essentially uncorrelated in both Study 2 and 3, 
suggesting the constructs are unrelated.   
 Further psychometric support for the SST-BPA comes from Miller et al. (in press) 
in the form of postdictive validity, where a bias toward big picture appraisal was trained 
implicitly, using cognitive bias modification techniques (e.g., MacLeod & Mathews, 
2012). A preliminary version of the SST-BPA detected group differences between 
individuals in the BPA training condition and individuals in a personal/evaluative 
training condition (i.e., seeing both positive and negative events as reflecting one’s 
general positive or negative personal attributes rather than seeing events in a larger 
context), with the BPA group unscrambling sentences to form BPA statements more 
often.  
 In summary, the studies described above provide preliminary support for the SST-
BPA as a useful tool for research on emotion regulation. It may also be useful in applied 
contexts, although further investigation is needed to support clinical uses. A particular 
benefit of the SST-BPA is that it does not rely on standard self-report methodology. 
Performance measures such as the SST-BPA can reveal new facts about the individual 
not available on the basis of self-report by capturing the mind in action rather than as an 
object of self-reflection, and therefore can be seen as potentially tapping into different 




Self-reported traits, although capturing important continuities in the individual, are 
relatively insensitive to the moment-to-moment variations in information processing that 
determine concurrent behavior and experience. A focus on performance measures can fill 
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